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Abstract. As machine-learning (ML) based systems for malware detec-
tion become more prevalent, it becomes necessary to quantify the benefits
compared to the more traditional anti-virus (AV) systems widely used
today. It is not practical to build an agreed upon test set to benchmark
malware detection systems on pure classification performance. Instead
we tackle the problem by creating a new testing methodology, where we
evaluate the change in performance on a set of known benign & malicious
files as adversarial modifications are performed. The change in perfor-
mance combined with the evasion techniques then quantifies a system’s
robustness against that approach. Through these experiments we are
able to show in a quantifiable way how purely ML based systems can
be more robust than AV products at detecting malware that attempts
evasion through modification, but may be slower to adapt in the face of
significantly novel attacks.
1 Introduction
The threat and impact of malicious software (malware) has continued to grow
every year. The annual financial impact is already measured in the hundreds
of billions of dollars [2, 11]. Simultaneously, there are worries that the classical
anti-virus approach may not continue to scale and fail to recognize new threats
[36].
Anti-virus systems were historically built around signature based approaches.
Wressnegger et al. [38] discussed a number of issues with signatures, but the
primary shortcoming is an intrinsically static nature and inability to generalize.
Most anti-virus companies have likely incorporated machine learning into their
software, but to what extent remains unclear due to the nature of proprietary
information. Regardless, adversaries can still successfully evade current detection
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systems with minimal effort. The success of methods like obfuscation and poly-
morphism is evident by its prevalence, and recent work has suggested that the
majority of unique malicious files are due to the use of polymorphic malware [19].
Given these issues and urgency, Machine Learning would appear to be a
potential solution to the problem of detecting new malware. Malware detection
can be directly phrased as a classification problem. Given a binary, we define some
feature set, and learn a binary classifier that outputs either benign or malicious.
The output of this model could be calibrated to reach any desired false-positive
ratio.
However, one should never switch to a new technology for its own sake. It is
necessary to have empirical and quantifiable reasons to adopt a new approach
for malware detection. Ideally, this would be based off the accuracy of current
anti-virus systems compared to their machine-learning counterparts. In reality,
this is non-trivial to estimate, and many arguments currently exist as to how this
should be done [6, 13, 35]. Designing a corpus and test protocol to determine
accuracy at large is hampered by issues like concept drift [12], label uncertainty,
cost [20], and correlations over time [14, 34].
Toward remedying this issue, we propose a new testing methodology that
can highlight a detector’s strength or weakness with regard to specific attack
types. We first utilize the framework from Biggio et al., to specify a model for our
adversary [4]. After defining the adversary’s goal, knowledge, and capabilities,
we look at how difficult it is for an adversary with known malware to evade
malware detection systems under comparison. As examples, we compare two
machine learning approaches, one a simpler n-gram model and one neural network
based, to a quartet of production AV systems. While we do not exhaustively
test all possible evasion techniques, we show the potential for our protocol
using a handful of relevant tests: non-destructive automated binary modification,
destructive adversarial attacks, obfuscation through packing, and malicious
injection. We are specifically looking only at black box attacks which can be
applied to any potential malware detector, assuming that the adversary is looking
for maximal dispersion and not a targeted attack. This new evaluation protocol
is our primary contribution, and a black-box adversarial attack for byte-based
malware detectors our second contribution. This evaluation protocol allows us to
make new conclusions on the potential benefits and weakness of two byte based
machine learning malware detectors.
We will review previous work in section 2. The experiments and methodology
we use to compare our ML based systems to anti-virus will be given in section 3
and section 4, followed by their results in section 5. We will discuss the higher
level takeaways in section 6, and then conclude in section 7.
2 Related Work
Malware detection and analysis has been an area of active research for several
years. One class of techniques that is of particular note is dynamic analysis, where
the binary itself is run to observe its behavior. Intuitively, malicious behavior is
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the best indicator of a malicious binary — making dynamic analysis a popular
approach [8]. However, dynamic analysis has many complications. It requires
significant effort and infrastructure to make it accurately reflect user environments,
which are often not met in practice [29]. Furthermore, the malware author can use
a number of techniques to detect dynamic execution, hide behavior, or otherwise
obfuscate such analysis. This means effective dynamic analysis systems are often
a cat-and-mouse game of technical issues, and can require running binaries across
many layers of emulation [7].
It is for these reasons that we focus on the static analysis case. This removes
the unlimited degrees of freedom provided by actually running code. However,
this does not mean the malicious author has no recourse. Below we will review
the related work in this area.
Questions regarding the security of machine learning based systems have
been an active area of research for over a decade [3, 5], but have recently
received increased attention. This is in particular due to the success in generating
adversarial inputs to neural networks, which are inputs that induce an incorrect
classification despite only minor changes to the input [9, 37]. These approaches
generally work by taking the gradient of the network with respect to the input,
and adjusting the input until the network’s output is altered. This does not
directly translate to malware detection when using the raw bytes, as bytes are
discontinuous in nature. That is to say, any change in a single byte’s value is
an equally “large” change, whereas in images, adjusting a pixel value can result
in visually imperceptible changes. Arbitrary byte changes may also result in a
binary that does not execute, making it more difficult to apply these attacks
in this space [10, 30]. While such attacks on individual models are possible [15,
17], we are concerned with attacks that can be applied to any detector, therefore
these methods are out of the scope of this work.
To overcome the issue with arbitrary byte changes breaking executables,
Anderson et al. [1] developed a set of benign actions that can modify a binary
without changing its functionality. Selecting these actions at random allowed
malware to evade a ML model 13% of the time. Introducing a Reinforcement
Learning agent to select the actions increased this to 16% of the time. Their
ML model used features from the PE header as well as statistics on strings and
bytes from the whole binary. We will replicate this type of attack as one of the
comparisons between our ML systems and anti-virus.
Another approach is to modify the bytes of a binary, and run the malware
detection system after modification. While this risks breaking the binary, it can
still be effective, and it is important to still quarantine malware even if it does
not execute as intended. Wressnegger et al. [38] modified each binary one byte at
a time, and found that single byte changes could evade classical AV detectors.
They used this approach to find which bytes were important to the classification,
and reverse-engineered signatures used from multiple AV products. We extend
this technique in subsection 4.2 to create a new adversarial approach against
our models, which finds a contiguous byte region which can be altered to evade
detection.
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For the machine learning based malware detection methods, we look at two
approaches: byte n-grams and neural networks. The byte n-gram approach was
one of the first machine learning methods proposed for malware detection [32],
and has received significant attention [16]. We use the same approach for training
such models as presented in Raff et al. [28]. For the neural network approach we
use the recently proposed MalConv, which processes an entire binary by using
an embedding layer to map bytes to feature vectors followed by a convolutional
network [26]. Because the embedding layer used by MalConv is non-differentiable
with respect to the input bytes, the aforementioned adversarial approaches applied
to image classification tasks are not as easily applicable. Similarly, anti-virus
products do not provide a derivative for such attacks. This is why we develop a
new black-box adversarial approach in subsection 4.2.
Using these modeling methods is beneficial for our analysis because they are
trained with minimal assumptions about the underlying data. Other approaches
to malware detection that process the PE-header [33] or use disassembly [21]
exist. We avoid these under the belief that their use of explicit feature sets aids in
evading them (e.g, modifying the PE-Header is easy and allows for direct evasion
of models using those features).
We leverage the existing framework from [4] to model our adversary for
each comparison made. This framework prescribes defining the adversary’s goals,
knowledge, and capabilities in regards to the classifiers.
3 Adversarial Model
For each experiment we specify the model of our adversary by outlining the goals,
knowledge, and capabilities available [4]. These make clear the assumptions and
use cases presented by each scenario.
The goal of our adversary is the same across all experiments – using a
single attack to maximize the misclassification rate of malicious files across
many classifiers. The one caveat is that in subsection 4.2 we only goes as far as
identifying a small portion of the file which can be altered to evade detection. A
real attacker would then have to alter those bytes while retaining the malicious
functionality of the file. It is unlikely that authors of benign software would seek a
malicious classification – therefore we limit ourselves to experiments on malware
only.
We severely constrain the knowledge of our adversary. In all cases we assume
the adversary has no knowledge of the classifiers’ algorithms, parameters, training
data, features, or decision boundaries. This is the best case scenario for security
applications, as knowledge of any of the previous attributes would increase the
sophistication of possible attacks.
Similarly, the experiments outlined in subsection 4.1, subsection 4.3, and
subsection 4.4 require no prior interaction with the classifiers before deploying a
malicious file to the wild. In subsection 4.2, the adversary has the capability of
querying our n-gram model only. The inner workings of the model remain hidden,
but the output of the model is available for deductive reasoning.
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These assumptions are restrictive to the adversary’s actions and knowledge,
but are important because current adversaries are able to succeed under such
restrictions today. This means malware authors can obtain success with minimal
effort or expense. Through our evaluation procedure we are able to better
understand which techniques / products are most robust to this restricted
scenario, and thus will increase the effort that must be expended by malware
authors.
4 Experiments and Methodology
We now perform experiments under our proposed testing methodology to compare
machine learning models to commercial anti-virus systems. To do so, we compare
two machine learning classifiers and four commercial anti-virus products: AV1,
AV2, AV3, and AV4. We use these anonymous names to be compliant with
their End User License Agreements (EULA), which bars us from naming the
products in any comparative publication. We are prohibited from using the
internet based mass scanners, like VirusTotal, for similar reasons. Ideally, we
could test many products, but with our large corpus of files we limit ourselves to
these four – which we believe to be representative of the spectrum of commercially
used AV platforms. We purposely did not chose any security products which
advertise themselves as being primarily powered by machine learning or artificial
intelligence. Additionally, any cloud based features which could upload our files
were disabled to protect the proprietary nature of our dataset. Our machine
learning based approaches will be built upon n-grams and neural networks which
process a file’s raw bytes. We will compare these systems on a number of tasks
to evaluate their robustness to evasion.
We now describe our new testing protocol. Given a corpus {x1, . . . , xn} of
n files with known labels yi ∈ {Benign,Malicious}, and detector C(·) we first
measure the accuracy of C(xi),∀i. This gives us our baseline performance. We
then use a suite of evasion techniques φ1(·), . . . , φK(·) and look at the difference
in accuracy between C(xi) = yi and C(φ(xi)) = yi. The difference in these scores
tells us the ability of the detector C(·) to generalize past its known data and
catch evasive modifications. Any approach for which C(xi) 6= C(φj(xi)) for many
different evasion methods φ which preserve the label yi, is then an intrinsically
brittle detector, even if it obtains perfect accuracy before φ is used.
The raw detection accuracy is not the point of this test. Each system will
have been built using different and distinct corpora of benign and malicious files.
For the AV products, these are used to ensure that a certain target level of false
positives and false negatives are met. In addition, the training corpus we use
for our models is orders of magnitude smaller than what the AV companies will
have access to. For this reason we would not necessarily expect our approaches
to have better accuracy. The goal is to quantify the robustness of any classifier
to a specific threat model and attack.
One novel and three pre-existing techniques (“φ”s) will be used to perform this
evaluation. These are not exhaustive, but show how our approach can be used to
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quantify relative performance differences. Below we will review their methodology,
and the information that we can glean from their results. In section 5 we will
review the results of running these experiments.
Dataset
We take only a brief moment to expound upon the machine learning models
and data used for training, as the information disparity with other AV products
makes direct comparison difficult. We trained the machine learning models on
a large dataset from industry discussed in [27] which contains approximately
2 million samples balanced almost evenly between benign and malicious. Our
test set consists of approximately 80,000 files held out for our post-training
experimentation. The test set is also almost perfectly balanced. This set was
not seen by our machine learning models during training, but could have files
previously seen by the anti-virus corporations. The n-gram model follows the
procedure used in [28], but uses one million features instead of 100,000. The
MalConv approach is specified in [26]. Both of these approaches require no domain
knowledge to apply.
4.1 Randomly Choosing Benign Modifications
In this experiment, we use a subset5 of the modifications used by Anderson et al.
[1] to alter malicious files before scanning them with the classifiers. The objective
is to test the brittleness of the classifiers’ decision mechanisms by making small
changes that do not alter the functionality of the malware. This experiment is
ideal because it produces a new file that is still functional, and should have no
impact on an ideal malware detector.
There are nine different modification actions, and grouped by type are:
– rename or create new sections
– append bytes to the end of a section or the file
– add an unused function to the import table
– create a new entry point (which jumps to the old entry)
– modify the header checksum, the signature, or debug info
Each malicious file was scanned before the experiment to see if it was already
being misclassified as benign (false negative). If it was correctly classified as
malicious then a modification was randomly selected from the set and applied.
This process was repeated up to ten times or until the file evaded the classifier.
Approaches that rely too heavily on exact signatures or patterns should suffer in
this test, and we would expect any approach that uses purely dynamic features
to be unaffected by the modifications.
This experiment is time intensive, and so we use a subset of 1,000 files
randomly chosen from our test set. Anderson et al. limited themselves to a small
200 file sample, so our larger test set may provide additional confidence in the
5 A UPX (un)packing option did not operate correctly and so was excluded.
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results. The original paper proposed using a reinforcement learning algorithm
(RLA) to select the modifications in an adversarial manner. We found that
including a RLA did not change results, but did limit our ability to test with all
products in a timely manner.
4.2 Targeted Occlusion of Important Bytes
The first approach described requires extensive domain knowledge based tooling,
and would be difficult to adapt to new file types. We introduce a novel approach
to find important byte regions of a malicious file given a working detector.
Identifying the most important region of a file gives feedback to adversaries, and
allows us to occlude that region as an evasion technique.
Our approach works by occluding certain bytes of a file, and then running the
malware detector on the occluded file. By finding a contiguous region of bytes
that reduced the detector’s confidence that a file is malicious, we can infer that
the bytes in that region are important to the detector. If occluding a small region
causes the detector to change its vote from malicious to benign, then we can infer
that the detector is too fragile. In this case it is plausible for a malware author
to determine what is stored in the small region detected, and then modify the
binary to evade detection.
Manually editing groups of bytes one at a time would be computationally
intractable. Given a file F of |F | bytes, and a desired contiguous region size of β,
it would take O(|F |) calls to the detector to find the most important region. We
instead develop a binary-search style procedure, which is outlined in Algorithm 1.
Here C(·) returns the malware detector’s confidence that a given file is malicious,
and D is a source of bytes to use for the occlusion of the original bytes. This
approach allows us to find an approximate region of importance in only O(log |F |)
calls to the detector C(·). In the event that C(Fl) = C(Fr), ties can be broken
arbitrarily – which implicitly covers the boolean decisions from an anti-virus
product.
This method starts with a window size equal to half of the file size. Both
halves are occluded and the file is analyzed by the classifier. The half that results
in the largest drop in classification confidence is chosen to be split for the next
time step. This binary search through the file is continued until the window size
is at least as small as the target window size.
The last component of our approach is to specify what method D should
be used to replace the bytes of the original file. One approach, which we call
Random Occlusion, is to simply select each replacement byte at random. This is
similar to prior work in finding the important regions of an image according to
an object detector, where it was found that randomly blocking out the pixels was
effective — even if the replacement values were nonsensical [39]. We also look
at Adversarial Occlusion, where we use a contiguous region selected randomly
from one of our own benign training files to occlude the bytes in the file under
test. Since we use this approach only with malicious files, Adversarial Occlusion
is an especially challenging test for our machine learning based methods: they
have seen these byte regions before with an explicit label of benign. This test
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Algorithm 1 Occlusion Binary Search
Require: A file F of length |F |, a classifier C(·), target occlusion size β, byte replace-
ment distribution D
1: split ← |F |/2, size ← |F |/2
2: start ← 0, end ← |F |
3: while size > β do
4: Fl ← F , Fr ← F
5: Fl[split−size:split] ← contiguous sample from ∼ D
6: Fr[split:split+size] ← contiguous sample from ∼ D
7: if C(Fl) < C(Fr) then
8: split ← split− size/2
9: start ← split− size
10: end ← split
11: else
12: split ← split+ size/2
13: start ← split
14: end ← split+ size
15: size← size/2
16: return start, end
also helps to validate that all approaches aren’t simply detecting high-entropy
regions that “look” packed, and then defaulting to a decision of malicious.
To show that our search procedure provides meaningful improvements for the
Random and Adversarial Occlusions, we will also compare against an Undirected
Occlusion approach that eschews our search procedure. In this case we randomly
select a region of the binary to occlude with high-entropy random bytes.
Recall, that this method identifies the critical region – for a successful attack
the adversary would then have to manually alter the portion of the file at that
location while maintaining their intended outcome. For this reason, we use a
single target window size of 2048 bytes. The resulting occluded area will fall in
the range of (1024-2048] bytes. On average, this restricts the occluded section to
under 0.5% of the file size for our testing set. We also limit ourselves to searching
for critical regions with our n-gram model. It would be infeasible for an adversary
to conduct this search across all possible classifiers, and we would expect there
to be some overlap among which regions are critical. This has been shown to be
true in gradient based classifiers, where an adversarial example generated by one
model can fool many others [24].
4.3 Classification of Packed Files
Packing is a common obfuscation technique used by adversaries [22]. It also
has legitimate uses, such as faster download times and protecting intellectual
property. For this reason packed files cannot be assumed to be malicious. An effect
of packing is that the machine instructions cannot be immediately deciphered
without being unpacked first. This presents a challenge for classification using
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static analysis. In this experiment we use the popular UPX packer [23] to pack
the benign and malicious files in our testing set. The only functional difference
in the packed files is the process of unpacking itself during execution — the
malicious/benign behavior of the files remains unchanged. We expect packing
will greatly hinder our machine learning models, which require features to be
present in the raw bytes. Packing does not completely obfuscate the file however,
as data in areas like the PE header are required for a file to be executed. We
observe the effect of packing on classification accuracy by rescanning the packed
versions of the files.
The purpose of this test is to determine if the machine learning based models
learn a degenerate “packing = malicious” decision process. This can happen easily,
as the majority of packed training data came from malicious files.
4.4 ROP Injection
The last method we will consider is of a different variety. Instead of modifying
known malicious files in an attempt to evade detection, we will inject malicious
functionality into otherwise benign applications.
Many such techniques for this exist. We used the Return Oriented Program-
ming (ROP) Injector [25] for our work. The ROP Injector converts malicious
shellcode into a series of special control flow instructions that are already found
inside the file. These instructions are inherently benign, as they already exist in
the benign file. The technique patches the binary in order to modify the memory
stack so that the targeted instructions, which are non-contiguous in the file, are
executed in an order equivalent to the original shellcode. The result is that the
functionality of the file is maintained, with the added malicious activity executing
right before the process exits. We use the same reverse Meterpreter shellcode as
Poulios et al. [25] for our experiment.
We note that not all benign executables in our testing set were injectable.
The files must either have enough instructions to represent the shellcode already,
or have room for further instructions to be added in a non-contiguous manner
so as to prevent raising suspicion. Additionally, if the malware requires external
functionality such as networking capabilities, and these are not inherent to the
original executable, then portions of the PE header such as the import table
must be adjusted. For these reasons, only 13,560 files were successfully infected.
Poulios et al. claim they were able to evade anti-virus over 99% of the time
using this technique. This approach should be nearly undetectable with static
analysis alone, as all instructions in the file remain benign in nature. This makes it
an extremely difficult test for both the machine learning and anti-virus detectors.
5 Results
Before delving into results, we make explicit that we considered Malware the
positive class and Benign the negative class, as outlined in Table 1. We remind
the reader that not all tested systems are on equal footing. Our n-gram and
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MalConv models are trained on the same corpus, but we have no knowledge
of the corpora used by the AV companies and their products. In all likelihood,
they will be using datasets orders of magnitude larger than our own to ensure
the quality of their products and to reach a desired false-positive rate. From
this perspective alone, we would not necessarily expect the machine learning
based methods to have better accuracies, as there is a disparity of information at
training time. Our methods are also not optimized for the same low false-positive
goal.
Table 1. True and false positive and negatives for malware classification task
File is Malware File is Benign
Classifier says Malware True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP)
Classifier says Benign False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN)
The accuracies and metrics of each method are presented in Table 2. Because
of the mentioned information disparity between each system, we do not present
this information for direct comparison. Our goal is to use these metrics as a base-
line measure of performance for each method, and look at how these baselines
are affected by various evasion techniques.
Table 2. Baseline accuracy and true/false positive/negative results for each model on
the test set.
Classifier TN% TP% FN% FP% Accuracy%
N-Gram 92.1 98.7 1.3 7.9 95.5
MalConv 90.7 97.2 2.8 9.3 94.1
AV1 94.3 99.5 0.5 5.7 97.0
AV2 99.4 64.9 35.1 0.6 81.6
AV3 98.5 80.5 19.5 1.5 89.2
AV4 93.8 91.9 8.1 6.6 92.6
5.1 Benign Modifications
The results of the experiment described in subsection 4.1 are shown in Figure 1.
All four anti-virus products were significantly degraded by making seemingly
insignificant changes to the malware files. The machine learning models were
immune to this evasion technique. Both model’s confidence that these files were
malware changed by less than 1% on average. The few files that did evade were
very close to the models’ decision boundaries before the modifications were
performed.
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Fig. 1. Robustness of classifiers to benign modifications. The blue bar (left) represents
the number of false negatives before any modifications were made. The red bar (center)
represents the number of files that were able to evade. The tan bar (right) represents
the number of files that were still classified correctly after 10 modifications. Higher is
better for the tan bar, and lower is better for all others.
The anti-virus products did not perform as well in this test. AV3 and AV4
were the most robust to these modifications, with 130 and 215 files evading each
respectively. While this is better than products like AV1, where 783 out of 1000
malicious files where able to evade, it is still an order of magnitude worse than
the 3 and 20 files that could evade the n-gram and MalConv models, respectively.
Given these results, one might wonder — could the ML based models be
evaded by this approach if more modifications were performed? In particular,
a number of the modifications have multiple results for a single action. So re-
applying them is not unreasonable. To answer this question, we look at the
evasion rate as a function of the number of modifications performed in Figure 2.
In this plot we can see that all four AV products have an upward trending slope
as the number of modifications is increased. In contrast, the n-gram model is
completely unchanged from 3 or more modifications, and MalConv at 4 or more.
This would appear to indicate that the ML approaches are truly immune to this
evasion technique, whereas the AVs are not.
These results also speak to the use of dynamic evaluation, or lack thereof, in
the AV products at scan time. Any dynamic analysis based approach should be
intrinsically immune to the modifications performed in this test. Because we see
all AV products fail to detect 13-78% of modified malware, we can postulate that
if any dynamic analysis is being done its application is ineffectual.
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Fig. 2. The number of files that evade increase as the number of modifications increases.
Lower is better.
We make note that in the original work of Anderson et al. [1], they applied
this attack to a simple machine learning based model that used only features
from the PE header. This attack was able to evade the PE-feature based model,
but not the byte based models tested under our framework.
5.2 Targeted Occlusion
The experiment detailed in subsection 4.2 attempts to modify the most important
region for detecting the maliciousness of a binary as deduced from querying only
the n-gram model and attempting to transfer that knowledge to all others.
The results for the byte occlusion tests are given in Figure 3, where the blue
bar shows the accuracy on 40,000 malicious files when no bytes are occluded. For
both the n-gram and MalConv models, we see that the Random, Undirected, and
Adversarial occlusion attacks have almost no impact on classification accuracy.
In the case of the n-gram model, only 0.13% of the files where able to evade its
detection after occlusion. Again evasions were highly correlated with files close
to the decision boundary.
In particular, we remind the reader that the Adversarial occlusion is replacing
up to 2KB of the malicious file with bytes taken from benign training data.
This is designed to maximally impact the ML approaches, as the model was
trained with the given bytes as having an explicit label of benign. Yet, the
Adversarial choice has almost no impact on results. This is a strong indicator of
the potential robustness of the ML approach, and that simply adding bytes from
benign programs is not sufficient to evade their detection.
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Fig. 3. Robustness to byte level manipulations. Black dashed line indicates maximum.
The blue bar (far left) represents number of files classified correctly before occlusion.
The red bar (left center) represents the number of files classified correctly after random
occlusion. The tan bar (center right) represents the number of files classified correctly
after targeted occlusion using random bytes. The dark gray bar (far right) represents
the number of files classified correctly after targeted occlusion using bytes from known
good files.
Considering the AV products we again see a different story. AV1 had the
highest detection rate when no occlusion occurred, but also had the largest drop
in detection rate for all three types of occlusion. AV4 had the best performance
among the AV vendors, but was still impacted by the occlusion of bytes and did
not perform as strongly as the ML models.
From the AV results it is also clear that the Targeted Random occlusion is
an improvement over the Undirected occlusion of random bytes, showing that
Algorithm 1 is effective at identifying important regions. This was not discernible
from the n-gram and MalConv models, which are relatively immune to this
scenario.
Although on average the occlusion was limited to 0.5% of a file’s bytes, we
acknowledge that one could argue this transformation may have altered the true
label of the file. The search could be potentially removing the malicious payload
of the application, rendering it muted (if runnable). We accept this possibility
under the assumption that the adversary now has enough information to alter
this small portion of the file in order to break possible signatures.
The results from the machine learning models would suggest that maliciousness
is not contained to a small contiguous section of most files. This makes intuitive
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sense, as malicious functionality being employed in executable sections of a file
might also require functions to be referenced in the import table. The non-
contiguous nature of the PE file format allows for many similar circumstances,
and so we believe it unlikely that all of a file’s maliciousness would be contained
within a small contiguous region of a binary. In addition, this results in binaries
that are analogous to deployed malware with bugs. Just because malware may
not function properly, and thus not negatively impact users, doesn’t remove its
malicious intent and the benefit in detecting it.
5.3 Packed Files
We observe the effect of packing on classification by comparing the baseline
accuracies of the detectors to the accuracies after packing. As shown in Table 3,
packing with UPX degrades the performance of all detectors, with the lone
exception of AV4. The machine learning classifiers are less effective at classifying
packed benign files, while the anti-virus products are worse at classifying packed
malware. The disparity for the machine learning models is most likely a byproduct
of unbalanced distributions of packed versus unpacked files in the benign and
malicious training sets. For the anti-virus vendors, packing increases the false
positive rates because the obfuscation prevents signatures from being detected.
AV4’s accuracy increasing is evidence that the detector has UPX unpacking
capabilities built in. In terms of overall classification accuracy, AV1 suffered
the largest decrease at 19%. In comparison, the n-gram and MalConv network
decreased by 10% and 13% respectively.
Table 3. Effect of UPX Packing on Accuracy. Benign and Malware columns show the
TP and TN rates on the test corpus, with the Packed columns showing the TP and TN
rates after the data has been packed.
Classifier Benign Packed Benign Malware Packed Malware
N-Gram 92.1 74.8 98.7 95.0
MalConv 90.7 68.1 97.2 92.2
AV1 94.3 97.0 99.5 60.8
AV2 99.4 99.3 64.9 56.5
AV3 98.5 99.1 80.5 57.6
AV4 93.8 93.4 91.9 95.2
Bulk packing remains a challenge for any static analysis classification system.
The best solutions will either involve unpacking files if an unpacker exists, or
relying on dynamic analysis techniques. Our results indicate that ML based
systems, while also susceptible, are of comparable performance to current AV
systems in this regard.
14
5.4 ROP Injection Results
In Table 4 we show the results of running the ROPInjector on the benign test files.
The results are shown only for the 13,560 files that the ROPInjector was able to
infect. Before infection, the Pre-ROP Accuracy column indicates the percentage
of files correctly labeled benign. After infection, the Post-ROP Accuracy column
indicates what percentage were correctly labeled as malicious. The Post-ROP
Lift then shows how many percentage points of Post-ROP Accuracy came from
the classifier correctly determining that a formerly benign file is now malicious,
rather than simply being a false-positive. That is to say, if a model incorrectly
called a benign file malicious, it’s not impressive when it calls an infected version
of the file malicious as well.
Table 4. Accuracy on originally benign binaries before and after applying the ROPInjec-
tor.
Classifier Pre-ROP Accuracy Post-ROP Accuracy Post-ROP Lift
N-Gram 85.1 15.3 0.4
MalConv 82.4 18.8 1.2
AV1 99.3 1.3 0.6
AV2 98.7 1.2 −0.1
AV3 97.9 0.7 −1.4
AV4 89.2 32.9 22.1
Most malware detectors had significant difficulty with this task. The machine
learning based models, n-gram and MalConv, showed only modest improvements
of 0.4 and 1.2 percentage points. AV1 had a similarly small 0.6 improvement,
but surprisingly AV2 and AV3 had negative improvements. That means for 1.4%
of the benign files, AV3 called the original benign file malicious. But when that
same file was infected by the ROPInjector, AV3 changed its decision to benign.
This is a surprising failure case, and may be caused by the AV system relying
too heavily on a signature based approach.
Overall these models showed no major impact from the ROPInjector. Only
AV4 was able to significantly adjust its decision for 22.1% of the infected files
to correctly label them as malicious. Though the evasion rate for AV4 remains
high at 77%, it performed best in this scenario. Given the muted and negative
performance of the other AV systems in this test, we suspect AV4 has developed
techniques specifically for the ROPInjector approach.
We also notice that the benign files that were injectable include 67% of our
original false positives for the n-gram model. We suspect that this is due to those
files already containing the networking functionality required by the shellcode.
The majority of malware requires communication over the Internet, therefore our
machine learning detectors may view networking related features as somewhat
malicious in nature.
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Overall the ROPInjection of malicious code into otherwise benign applications
presents an apparent weakness for our machine learning approaches. An important
question is whether the ROPInjection is functionally invisible to the machine
learning based models (i.e., it could never detect features of the injection), or is
simply not sufficiently represented in our training data for the model to learn.
This questioned was tested by applying the ROPInjector to all of our training
data, both benign and malicious files, which resulted in 235,865 total ROPInjected
binaries. We then trained an n-gram model that tried to distinguish between
ROPInjected vs Not-ROPInjected binaries. The n-gram model was able to obtain
97.6% accuracy at this task with an AUC of 99.6%. This indicates that the models
could learn to detect ROPInjection, but that it is not sufficiently prevalent in
our training corpus for the models to have learned.
Overall this case highlights a potential advantage of the classical AV systems
with extensive domain knowledge. When sufficiently novel attacks are developed
for which current models have almost no predictive power, it may be easier to
develop and deploy new signatures to catch the attacks — while the machine
learning approaches may require waiting for data, or creating synthetic data
(which has its own risks) to adjust the model.
6 Discussion
We have now performed a number of tests where we modify a set of known
malicious files and observe how the modifications impact ML based and classical
AV systems. In performing these experiments, we note a number of interesting
high level results and questions.
6.1 A Fairer Evaluation Scheme
In our current work the AV products have been given an advantage in potential
knowledge; all the malware we are testing with has been known for some time and
likely been used by the AV companies in their product updates. In an ideal test
setting, all tested models would have been built with data from before a certain
date X, and tested on data from files first see on on a date after X. This same
kind of test was done by Saxe and Berlin [31] and found to have a significant
impact on results, and more accurately reflects real use.
While such first-seen information is available from sites like VirusTotal, we
unfortunately can’t afford a license that will allow us to get this information for
all of our data and have licensing restrictions that further complicate this. In
addition, we do not have a method of obtaining outdated versions of AV products,
making the evaluation further beyond our capability.
6.2 Detected Malware Robustness
Our initial results have shown that our Machine Learning based approaches,
n-gram and MalConv, are considerably more robust to evasion techniques on
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malicious files that are already classified correctly. That is, once the ML based
models detect a piece of malware — it appears likely the malware will require
significant modifications to evade detection. This is a positive results compared
to the AV systems.
Based on the Occlusion tests in particular, we can hypothesize that the ML
system’s robustness comes from using features dispersed through the whole of
the binary. If only a small portion of the file was used to make its conclusion,
the Adversarial Occlusion test in particular would have been more effective. In
contrast, the way signatures are designed encourages specificity. Using markers
from broad portions of the file to create a signature increases the risk that false
positives occur, which AV vendors are often trying to minimize.
6.3 Generic Adversarial Approaches to Malware
This work was done for Windows x86-x64 based binaries. But malware is a
problem that enters every new computing environment. One question worth
asking is, do the benefits (or costs) of a ML based system transfer to these other
domains as well? The byte occlusion test we developed in subsection 4.2 works
without knowledge of its domain, and so could be re-used for other file formats
(such as PDFs) or operating systems (such as Linux or iOS). Beyond simply
developing new tests for each domain format, what other tests can be developed
which can easily cross domains?
6.4 Executable Data Augmentation
We also take a moment to note an unexploited similarity between our work and
prior results in image classification. Augmenting the training data through the
use of content-preserving distortions (rotations, color alterations, cropping, etc.)
has long been used for training neural networks [18]. One question is whether
the evasion techniques used in this work could instead be used for improving the
machine learning models through a similar augmentation scheme. The results
with ROP injection in subsection 5.4 highlight a case where this could help the
models to learn to catch an attack they are currently missing. However, if any
of the techniques are used to perform augmented training, it may then become
invalid to use the same techniques to quantify the benefit of a Machine Learning
approach.
For example, training on ROPInjected binaries may only improve the model’s
ability to detect that specific type of adversarial alteration. For malware this is a
particularly important distinction, as the nearly-unlimited degrees of freedom
that are afforded by the Windows PE format may allow many new and novel
counter-measures, and our goal is for machine learning based systems to generalize
to new types of malware, never before seen. Thus training on the ROPInjector
may improve the apparent accuracy on current malware, but not improve its
performance with respect to novel malware. Measuring and quantifying this
concern is an important area for future work.
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7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated a new testing methodology for comparing the robustness
of machine learning classifiers to current anti-virus software. Furthermore, we
have provided evidence that machine learning approaches may be more successful
at catching malware that has been manipulated in an attempt to evade detection.
Anti-virus products do a good job of catching known and static malicious files,
but their rigid decision boundaries prevent them from generalizing to new threats
or catching evolutionary malware. We demonstrated that top tier anti-virus
products can be fooled by simple modifications including changing a few bytes or
importing random functions. The machine learning models appear to better gen-
eralize maliciousness — leading to an increased robustness to evasion techniques
compared to their anti-virus counterparts. Packed files and other obfuscation
techniques remain a challenge for pure static analysis systems, but future work
can be done to incorporate the power of machine learning for dynamic analysis
as well.
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